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Introduction,
By political change is meant a change in the constitution
of groups and individuals who effectively control political
decision-making in South Africa, The size and diversity of such
groups and number of individuals can either decrease, - in which
case there is an increase in authoritarianism, - or increase, -
in which case there is a move towards a decentralization or
diffusion of political control. A clear distinction must in this
case be made between interest groups, socio-economic and demo-
graphic processes, external or internal to South Africa, that
exert direct or indirect influenoe on the taking of political
decisions and the groups and individuals who effectively control
and are responsible for such decisions* This is simply another
way of stating that more often than not there is a discrepancy
between the pressures for change and the decisions taken to
cope with such pressures*
The central political problem in South Africa concerns the
- devolution of effective political decision-making to the Blacks,
At present, effective politioal participation is limited to
Whites, thus the problem is essentially a White-Black problem
where this division on political grounds coincides with divisions
regarding economic and social privileges. The factors affecting
the devolution of political control are of course numerous and
interrelated e.g. foreign investments, international relations
and pressure groups; external military threats; the viability
of the South African economy; rate of industrialization;
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population growth; Black political consciousness and resistance;
White Interest groups in South Africa etc. Most of these figure
in analyses conoerned with change in South Africa*
This paper would like to emphasize the strategic significance
of Afrikaner Nationalists in relation to the problem of political
change in South Africa. As a group they control effective
political decision-making within White politics and therefore
within South Africa in general. Whereas it could be true that if
Afrikaner Nationalists should lose this control to another White
group, it would not mean the solution of the problem of political
devolution, it ia equally true that the manner in which they come
to terms with this problem oould differ significantly from that
of another White group* It could be argued that the structural
constraints are such that in the long run It makes no difference
which White group is In control, the outcome would be the same,
but such an argument rests on a priori assumptions that in any case
need not take note of short term events that provide the basis
for more reliable if less dramatic predictions concerning
developments within South Africa*
This paper attempts to present old material in a new way;
in this sense, it is a "thought" paper rather than one claiming
to present new evidence or original research* Its major
theoretical point of departure can be found in treating the
Afrikaner Nationalists as an independant variable In relation to
political change and arguing their strategic significanoe in terms
of the following . assumptions: * •
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(a) The nature of present Afrikaner Nationalist control
of political decision-making must be understood in terms
of the development of Afrikaner bureaucracies In the
period 1910 - 1948*
(b) Folitioal control achieved in 1948 resulted in the inter-
locking of Afrikaner bureaucracies on the oligarohlo
level and consolidated Afrikaner Nationalist unity.
(o) At present the quality of Afrikaner Nationalism is
changing away from political exolucisivism but political
control is still entrenched in the same organizational
,• • structures* This broadens the base of political support
but does not significantly affect Afrikaner Nationalist
monopoly of political decision-making*
(d) Consequently an eleotoral ohange of government parti-
cularly from "left" of the government is extremely remote
and poses the problem of the role of White electoral
opposition in relation to the central problem of the
devolution of political decision-making to Blacks*
Before elucidating these points of departure it should be
/ . made clear that in discussing Afrikaner Nationalism the emphasis
will not be on the ideologioal level. i*e* the major tenets or
philosophical content of the belief system, but on the organiza-
tional conditions within which this ideology is reflected* These
conditions provide basic indicators of the parameters within
which a change in White political decision-making is possible*
/4 #••• •
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The Bureaucratizatlon of an Ethos*
One of the persistent myths of Afrikaner unity ia the
"all hearts beating as one" explanation. Frequently, Afrikaner
Nationalist politicians and cultural leaders propogate the idea
that every Afrikaner, even before the Great Trek, was part of
a national movement which was the result of each Afrikaner
Individual's desire for freedom and independence, of his wish
to maintain himself as part of an independant nation and of his
firm belief in the predestination of God. Largely, in the con-
temporary situation,' this type of explanation becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy and within certain spheres of Afrikaner
cultural life, acts as a strong factor for political mobilization.
However, the mythical nature of this explanation becomes
evident when events concerning White politics in general and
Afrikaner politics, in particular in the period 1910 - 1946^ are
recalled. For example : An Afrikaner Prime Minister and General
of the Boer War persecuting previous comrades in arms during
the rebellion of 1914 (Kruger, D.W., 1971, Ch. V); the political
conflict between Smuts and Hertzog, both veretans of the war
against British Imperialism; an Afrikaner Minister of Religion,
D,F, Malan, breaking away and attacking other Afrikaner leaders,
e,g. Hertzog; Hertzog's rejection of the Broederbond and Malan's
repudiation of the Ossewa Brandwag; the fact tiiat the majority
of the active servicemen during W.W.II were Afrikaners; (Van
Jaarsveld, 1971, pp# 247, 250, 252); the uneasy truce between
Malan, Havenga and Strydom for the purposes of the General Elec-
tion which led to an Afrikaner victory in 1948.
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These events illustrate the high degree of disunity and
internal conflict within Afrikaner ranks, rather than the opposite.
Yet, paradoxically, the groundwork for Afrikaner Unity was also
laid during this period. This oame about because of the develop*
ment of Afrikaner Bureaucracies on diverse fronts and the role
of oligarchies or elites within them.
Prior and up to 1910, the majority of White people lived in
a rural society. One can safely assume that the 25^ of the
White population that lived in urban areas by 1910 (Van Jaarsveld,
(• 1971, p# 297) consisted largely of non-Afrikaners. Although
Van Jaarsveld argues that Afrikaners had a collective conscious-
ness by 1881, what he says about the early Dutch Colonists
largely remained true for the Afrikaners in the Republic and the
Cape up to 1881, namely that their unity was more a common reaction
to environmental factors rather than a well organized and artic-
ulated ideological movement, (Van Jaarsveld, 1961, p.2.)
Obviously a number of faotors prior to 1910 were responsible for
the Afrikaners developing some self awareness, e.g, British
occupation, territorial needs, conflict with Blacks, etc. Singer's
concept of "ethno gene sis" (Wrong & Gracey, 1967, p# 437), is
appropriate to developments within Afrikaner ranks during this
period. This concept refers to a process whereby an ethnic
group is formed and the final stage in this development depends
on "the nature of the structures that develop the content of the
group's self image and the shared conception of its destiny,"
The point is that these structures, as far as the Afrikaners '
by 1910 were concerned,-were either absent of had a very tenuous
6.
hold on them. The most Important organizations were the churches,
and those related to the language movement. The low level of
Afrikaner urbanization at this stage, as well as poorly developed
faoilities for communication and transport, made regular meetings
and reinforcement of common loyalties extremely difficult. The
type of Afrikaner leadership during this stage is also character-
istic* Most of them were oharismatic leaders who had exceptional
personal qualities (Kriiger, Steyn) or who were prominent in the
Afrikaner's military struggle (De Wet, de la Rey, Botha, Hertzog,
Smuts) *
Thus one can argue that with the declaration of Union in
1910f the Afrikaners might have shared a common awareness based
on shared experiences but they still did not have an organized
unity of purpose* If there existed a collective ethos at this
time it was not yet bureaucratized and there was no clear indi-
cation in which direction it would develop* This soon became
apparent in the leadership struggles that developed between
Botha, Smuts, Hertzog and Malan* In fact the period between
1910 - 1948 was one characterized by factionalism, breakaways,
redefinitions of loyalty and the intermittent rejection of (
leaders, most of whom had been hailed as heroes a few years
earlier* During this period there was not a single Afrikaner
organization that seemed to enjoy the continued support and
loyalty of the majority of Afrikaans speaking people* One cannot
take seriously the statement that it is a "traditional character-
istic" of the Afrikaner that he has always been loyal to his
church, political party and organizations such as the P.A.K.
(Kotze, 1968, p, 55) especially if one remembers that with the
election of 1943 Smuts had 650,000 votes In his favour against
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the 350,000 of the opposition (Van Jaarsveld, 1971, p. 252). To
talk of a collective Afrikaner ethoe as the main faotor shaping
their destiny during this period is a concession to ideology
which distorts the truth.
And yet the process of bureauoratization of Afrikaner life,
coinciding with the processes of urbanization and industrialization
provided the conditions for the development of such an ethos.
If one could single out an outstanding feature reflecting the
average Afrikaner's life during the period 1910 - 1948, then it
. is the various processes by which the Afrikaner became an
"organization man". On all fronts of Afrikaner life, bureaucracies
developed. On the economic front:' S.A.N.L.A.M., S.A.N.T.A.M.,
Die Reddingsdaadbond, Federale Volksbelegging, Blanke Werkers
Beskermingsbond, Ko-ordinerende Raad van Suid-Afrikaanse Vakbonde,
Yskor, Foskor, Evkom. In 1936 Dr. A# Hertzog formed the "reform
league" to launch an attack on the leaders of Trade Unions with
a large Afrikaner membership. (Horrel, 1969, p. 10).
The cultural bureaucracies were: Akademie vir Taal, Lettere
en Kuns, Broederbond, F.A.K., Die Ossewa Brandwag, S.A.B.R.A.
Whereas political organizations inoluded: The South African
National Party (Botha); the United Party (Hertzog & Smith); the
Purified National Party (Malan); the New Order (Pirow) and the
Afrikaners Party (Havenga).
A common feature of all these bureaucracies is that the
majority of people belonging to them spoke Afrikaans. Language
was also one of the main issues in two other prominent Afrikaans
bureaucracies, namely the Afrikaans churches and educational
institutions. The important point about these bureaucracies is
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that they originated in different spheres of activity often for
diverse and even contradictory goals. However, in them elite
groups could articulate the needs of their members as they con-
oeived of them and interpret the events which the majority of
Afrikaners were experiencing. Above all, Afrikaner collective
action could be mobilized on diverse fronts and the recruitment
of regular leaders was made possible* The leaders encouraged,
exhorted and pleaded with Afrikaners to understand and reaot to
the changes they were experiencing.
These changes were formidable and extensive. The two more
important concerned the massive process of urbanization of ^
Afrikaners and their economic position during a period of equally
large scale industrialization. An idea of the rate of urbanization
can be gained if one remembers that in 1910 about 75# of Whites
were rural inhabitants whereas in 1961 only 16$ still lived there.
The dislocation brought about by such a migration as well as the
economic position of the Afrikaner vis-a-vis non-Afrikaner Whites
as well as Blacks, was a common thread which linked various
Afrikaner bureaucracies. Cultural, political and economic organi-
zations addressed themselves to this problem. Thus the Afrikaan^
churches held national conferences on the poverty of the Afrikaner
in 1893, 1916, 1923 and 1934 (Van Jaarsveld, 1971, p. 313).
Hertzog used the state bureaucracy to introduce a "civilized
labour" policy in 1924* The F.A.K., a cultural organization,
organized a national conference in 1939 from which developed
Die Keddingsdaadbond - an organization specifically geared to the
economic advancement of the Afrikaner. At the same time the
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Afrikaans language wae a symbol of this poverty, but also a strong
unifying factor in education, literature and religion.
Yet, despite all these ohanges and attempts to deal with
them, political unity before 1948, remained an unattainable
goal for Afrikaners. When it did happen it was brought about
by events outside Afrikaner ranks. These events were symbolized
by the vote in Parliament on Sept. 4, 1939, when Smuts committed
S.A. to YT.W.II. This decision did not immediately lead1 to polit-
ical unity but as Stultz (Plural Sooieties, Autumn, 1972, p.26)
argues persuasively, it lead to Hertzog breaking away from Smuts
and joining Malan in the He-United'Uational Party. Although
Smuts won the election in 1943 with a handsome majority, his
opposition consisted of all the re-aligned Afrikaner organizations
The average members may not have been as devoted and enthusiastic
as their leaders, but the latter could negotiate and consolidate
amongst themselves. They desperately needed political victory
to consolidate the unity of Afrikaans. The declaration of peace
and the immediate post-war situation favoured this possibility.
Malan and Strydom decided to forget their differences for the
moment, but most important, Malan and Havenga decided to join
forces for the 1948 election. On this agreement Stultz comments
ae follows:
"The importance to Malan of his alliance with Havenga became
clear on the morning of May 28 when the final results of
the general election were known. The Re-United National
Party Increased its representation in the House of Assembly
by 22, from 48 to 70 members, but this total was still 7
seats short of an absolute majority. The Afrikaner Party
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however, won 9 of the 10 seats it had contested. For only
the second time in the political history of the Union, a
government was turned out of office by voters,n (1972, p,32)
However, for the first time in the history of the Afrikaners,
a fully fledged "organization man" was Prime Minister. He had
been at various times a minister of religion, newspaper editor
and a party political leader. The "age of the generals" was
past and Malan, in a sense, was a symbol of a collective ethos
that had been bureaucratized, The victory of 1948 meant, amongst
other things, that political power, could now be used to give or-
ganizational consolidation to this ethos. Thus Kriiger could
 r
write of the Afrikaners that only one year after political vic-
tory: "Afrikanerdom was closing its ranks, ignoring outside
opinion and preparing to raise barriers to safeguard itself. The
unveiling of the Voortrekker Monument on 10. December 1949 was a
remarkable manifestation of this spirit." (1971, p, 250)
The Consolidation of Afrikaner Nationalists
It is generally agreed that the years immediately subsequent
to 1948 was a period of consolidation. (Van Jaarsveld, 1971,
Ch. XV; Kruger, 1971, Ch, XV & XVI). This was mainly brought C
about by a process of Afrikaner organizations interlocking with
one another at the top or elite level and clarifying the priorities
for maintaining Afrikaner unity, (For a behind the scenes look
at how this was done, Schoeman's book is as good as any in the
field of political gossip, 1973-) One clear priority which even
today transcends whatever internal differences might exist amongst
Afrikaner institutions, is the necessity to maintain political
control of South Africa, The almost hysterical reaction of the
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Afrikaner establishment to the breakaway of the H.N.P. (a right
wing Bplit from the National Party) in 1969 tinder Dr. A. Hertzog,
gave evidence of how sensitive it was to any development threat-
ening politioal unity# The time-worn bureaucratic slogan of
"change from within" became the rallying cry against the H.N.P.
accusation that the National Party was betraying the Afrikaner
ethos for political pragmatism.
The interlocking of Afrikaner organizations has had a few
important oonsequences for Afrikaners in South Africa. In the
first place it integrated leadership at the top of Afrikaner
... organizations. The trafficking of top personnel amongst these
organizations (as in the case of Malan) became a familiar occur-
rence: from Professor-to-Editor-to Prime Minister (Verwoerd);
Teacher-Party Organizer-Cabinet Minister (W.C. Botha); Minister
of Religion-Editor-M.P. (Treurnicht) etc.
Secondly, it introduced a great deal of organizational in-
dependence into everyday Afrikaner life. A child born into an
Afrikaans family could move from the cradle to the grave within
the framework of Afrikaner organizations : Afrikaans nursery,
primary and high schools; in the place of Boy Scouts the Voortrekk
the equivalent of the Chamber of Commerce is Die Afrikaanse Sake-
kamer and then a variety of cultural organizations already men-
tioned, plus new ones that developed such as Die Rapportryers
and Die Ruiterwag.
Thirdly, it facilitated the formulation of collective goals
for Afrikaner organizations and introduced a unity of purpose
into corporate Afrikaner action, e.g. "The Church" supports the -
Government; "the Universities" support "the Church" and vice
versa. This corporate support and interaction was facilitated
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by the intecrating role performed by certain Afrikaner organiza-
tions with overlapping membership such as the F.A.K., National
Party, the churches and Die Broederbond. For example, the F.A.K,
has affiliated to it more than 2000 cultural, religious and youth
bodies to which it gives f inane ial. and organizational assistance
(Serfontein, Sunday Times, 28.1.73). According to the same jour-
nalist the Broederbond has in its membership: 24 Principals of
Universities and Teachers Training Colleges; 171 Professors and
116 lecturers; 468 Headmasters; 121 School Inspectors; 647 Teache:
22 Newspaper Editors; 15 Directors of the S.A.B.C.; 59 Secretariet
of State Departments and 16 Judges (Sunday Times, 28.1,73).
Whether these figures are completely accurate is not as importa^ ';
as the underlying principle that such a voluntary organization
performs an important integrating role with regard to other or-
ganizations. It is not so important within which particular
Afrikaner organization a decision is eventually formalized, as
long as the taking of such a decision has the backing of other
Afrikaner organizations with possible vested interests. It is
this kind of information which can effectively be transmitted
by an exclusive organization with extensive overlapping membership
The fourth consequence that the interlocking of Afrikaner
organizations had, was to present the average Afrikaner with his
own "establishment". If one could venture a generalization on
especially. the "white collar" Afrikaans worker, it would be that
he is an "organization man" with a well developed awareness of
"the establishment". Who exactly embodies "the establishment"
can, of course, vary from one community to another, but for the
average "white collar" Afrikaner they are conceived of as having
the power to ostracize him, to influence his career and general
social acceptance.
/13....
13.
The abovementioned consequences are of course not unique to
the cane. Moot cultural groups with a high degree of ethnocentri-
oiam have their own organizations and display a certain degree
of exclusiveness. The distinctive feature of the Afrikaners as
an ethnic group within the political context of South Africa is
that through its control of political power, it not only governs
itself but the whole country. This fact presents both liabilities
and advantages to Afrikaner Nationalist Unity* The liabilities
revolve around the dilemma of coming to terms with societal issues
in such a way that Afrikaner political support is not threatened*
This will be discussed presently.
The advantages for Afrikaner unity are almost self evident.
It seems highly unlikely that the Afrikaner government could
mobilize support from all its adherents, be they Afrikaners of
non-Afrikaners, on purely exclusive value or ideological grounds.
This type of appeal is usually, more effective with culturally
conscious Afrikaners in the fields of education, religion, agri-
culture and some professional or semi-professional occupations.
The White "blue oollar" worker is far more sensitive to issues
that affect his immediate material interests* In this respect
political power and the machinery of state become very effective
instruments of manipulation.
The ratio between Afrikaners and non-Afrikaner Whites was
already 1,790,000 to 1,150,000 in I960 and 71# of the Whites
employed by the State were Afrikaners, (Van Jaarsveld 1971, p,275)
Apart from Whites employed by the State it has become tradition
in South Africa, since the implementation of Hertzog's "civilized
labour" policy that the government looks after the interests of
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the White worker* If it is taken into account that it ia in any
case the prerogative of the governing party in an electoral system
to manipulate, within limits, wage increases and economic condi-
tions in order to mobilize support, then it is clear, that Afrikane
political control is reinforced not' only by the "faithful" but by
White workers who are more or less"indifferent to the higher
ideals of Afrikaner Nationalism.
The picture that has been sketched of Afrikaner unity rests
on the assumption that this unity could not have been consolidated
without the use of political power. Secondly, that political powe:
alone could not have brought about this consolidation were it nt ,
for the existence of a variety of Afrikaner organizations within
which elite groups could resolve differences and mobilize collects
support. Thus, individually, political power and Afrikaner organ-
izations were necessary but not sufficient conditions for unity;
together they became sufficient and also interdependent*
Herein, then lies the strategic significance of Afrikaner
Nationalists within the overall political context of South Africa.
As a group they control political decision-making. This control
is conceived by them as a pre-condition for their existence as (
national group. This factor modifies a simplified collusion theor.
between Afrikaner political power and "English capital"; or a
straightforward White-vs-Black conspirational explanation; or the
underlying assumption of Adam (1971) that the Nationalists are
guided by a committment to "rational economic pragmatism". V/hat
is true of all these types of explanations is the primary importanc
of the relative degree of affluence and economic security of the
Afrikaners as a group, but so far this is mediated by the Afrikaner
/15
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control of the State and not so much of private capital. As the
group in control, they have made and undoubtedly will make adjust-
ments to the economy and demands from the socio-political sphere
but the tempo of these adjustments have, no doubt for very differ*
reasons, been a source of frustration for liberal economists and
Black activists. The real source of this frustration oould very
well be the difference for Afrikaner Nationalists between Afrikan
political control and White political control.
However, as was mentioned earlier, this control does present
some liabilities for the Afrikaner Nationalists. External to thei
a major problem is that political decisionmaking does not only
involve themselves. Internally the dilemma is presented by the
tension between maintaining an exclusive cultural identity and
at the same time maintaining political control. To put it differ
ently, Afrikaner Nationalists are making a cost-benefit analysis
of those "traditional characteristics" which are no longer regard
as necessary to maintain political control. It is not completely
fortuitioua that such an analysis can be afforded at a time when
there is significant change in the economic position and degree
of urban adjustment of Afrikaners generally. Some of the possibl
directions of this change can be evaluated within the framework c
the preceding analysis.
The Possibilities of Change
Recently, across the spectrum of "White politics" in South
Africa, a great deal of attention has been given to changes withi
the Afrikaner ranks. A number of events have contributed to this
interest: the rejection of H.N.P. leaders by the Nationalist Gov-
ernment; the ferment of discussion and questioning bjp Afrikaner
/16....
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intellectuals that sparked off the infatuation with the concept
of verligtheid (enlightenmont); attitude surveys by Afrikaans
newspapers and academics. For example Rapport (an Afrikaans Sunday
newspaper) found that 759^  of Afrikaners regarded themselves to
be South Africans first and then Afrikaners; 69# of the supporters
of the National Party regarded themselves as "verlig1' (Rapport
19.2,72). In five Dutch Reformed Church congregations in Pretoria,
62«9?& of the males and 52.2# of the females said it was not a sin
to vote for a political party that did not explicitly maintain the
Afrikaans language and traditions (Alant, 1972, p.47D). Appeals
by Afrikaner businessmen, academics and editors for a more tolerant,
attitude on racial and economic matters. This tolerance as far
as Afrikaner exclusivism is'concerned is succintly summarized by
De Klerk (Editor of Die Transvaler, an Afrikaans daily and coiner
of the term "verligtheid"). Under the significant caption of
"Who are the real Afrikaners" he pleads that " •••••we (sic) should
not disqualify Afrikaners who do not conform to our (sic) defini-
tion of what constitutes an Afrikaner* Today, being an Afrikaner
has a much more heterogenous meaning* There are many kinds of
Afrikaners but they are all still Afrikaners," (Die Transvaler,
21.12.7%) He then goes on to state that one can find liberal,
pregressive, atheistic and even Roman Catholic Afrikaners. Com-
pared to the position adopted by D.J. Kotze, (Professor of History
at the University of Stellenbosch and Chairman of Die Rapportryers),
in hie book Positiewe Nasionalisme. De Klerk's plea is nothing
less than cultural blasphemy.
These events led to a rather widespread conclusion that
Afrikaner Nationalists were becoming more enlightened and made a
re-alignment of political affiliation in "IVhite politics" possible.
/17...
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This, despite the fact that even at present no clarity exists as
to what "verligtheid11 is supposed to imply, The concept itself
is fast losing any political significance due to the fact that
political and quasi-political movements outside establishment
Afrikaner ranks have appropriated it in order to draw support
from Afrikaners* This is true of movements such as Verligte
Action, the Progressive Party and the "young turks" of the United
Party, Within these movements the hope is cherished that somehow
"verligte" Afrikaners will "save the situation"* However if one
confines the concept of "verligtheid" to the context within
( which it originated, viz. establishment Afrikanerdom, this en-
thusiasm appears to be somewhat misplaced*
In the first instance, Afrikaner "verligtheid" is not a
movement. An Afrikaner verligte is an individual who experiences
a conflict between the parochial demands of the particular organi-
zation within which he finds himself and the more universal
demands of his occupation. Thus an Afrikaans minister of religion
experiences a conflict between the demands made on him as a member
of an Afrikaans church and as a member of the "Universal Christian
Church"; an Afrikaans businessman feels the tension between the
demands of Afrikaner economic and political interests and the
dictates of supply-and-demand economic rationality; an Afrikaner
academic, especially in the humanities, has to come to terms with
problems regarded as "controversial" within his own University
and the predominant theories on these problems within the inter-
national academic community. Should such an individual make a
public concession to these universal demands, he becomes a "verligte".
Afrikaner "Verligte Action" has thus far been individual action.
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The important point is that different Afrikaner "verligtes"
respond to different and sometimes contradictory tensions, A
minister of religion who demands material sacrifice has something
else in mind than the businessman who pleads for a high eoonomio
growth rate. This is an important reason why no unified
"verligte movement" can develop. Different Afrikaners are simply
"verlig" about different kinds of things.
The attention given to Afrikaner verligtes, especially by
the English press, is due to the individually prominent Afrikaner
verligtes1 nuisance value to the establishment within the
institutional boundaries of the Afrikaner organization in which
he finds himself. The moment he moves outside these organiza-
tional boundaries the term "verligtheid" is no longer appropriate
and he can be placed on the traditional liberal-conservative
continuum of White politics. The dilemma of the Afrikaner
verligte is precisely that what he has to say is regarded as far
more important outside Afrikaner organizations than within. At
the same time he realises that he can only have a significant
impact for change if he can penetrate the oligarchy within his
own organization. The price for this membership is exactly
contrary to what he is doing, namely cautious conformity.
This brings the argument back to one of the central themes
of the preceding analysis, namely the power of Afrikaner
Nationalist elites making up the establishment. Any fundamental
split in Afrikaner unity will be manifested at the top, i.e.
within the oligarchic ranks of Afrikaner organizations. Thus,
for example, if the Synods of the major Afrikaans churches should
consistently oppose the caucus of the National Party, or vice
/19
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versa, or if Afrikaans Universities, in their corporate capacity
through councils and senates, should denounce the caucus or
Synods etc*, then significant threats to Afrikaner unity will
arise. Up to now, the advantages brought about by political
control have succeeded in transcending internal oligarchic
dissen3ion and maintaining a workable "elite consensus"* (Again
Sohoeman's book gives interesting insights into the personal
infighting behind the scenes to reach such a oonseneus on a
political level)*
I± was indicated earlier on however; that on this elite
level, the tensions between maintaining an exclusive cultural
identity and political control are beginning to manifest them-
selves* It is against this background that De KlerKa statement
referred to above can be understood* In the most general terms
the Implications for Afrikaner unity are that those organizations
which give primacy to those rigid and exclusive cultural and
moral values traditionally associated with Afrikaner Nationalists
(for the sake of brevity they can be called cultural organization
are beginning to lose influence in political decisionmaklng,
whereas those who can broaden the scope of political support are
gaining in strength. In the latter category the Afrikaans press
is definitely playing an important role much to the chagrin of
Afrikaner cultural organizations such as the F.A.K., Broederbond,
the churches and (r»H«A« (an organization whose goal is to promote
the purity of the Afrikaans language).
These developments are symptomatic of the underlying structu;
changes that the Afrikaners have experienced, namely, adjustment
to urban living and greater economic mobility. Because of this
cultural organizations have a decreasing appeal for Afrikaners
/20....
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generally and consequently a concommitant loss of political
influence* This is evident especially with regard to the more
affluent upper-class Afrikaners who have become more catholic
and/or generally bourgeoisie in their cultural pursuits and
strongly anti-Afrikaner traditionalism* Particularly interesting
also is the antagonism between the "cultural purists" and the •
Afrikaner literary and artistic establishment* Afrikaans lit-
erature and poetry has up to the sixties always been a strong
source of support for Afrikaner cultural organizations v/ith its
emphasis on "colloquial realism" (Van Wyk LOOT K.P,)* Since:
the sixties Afrikaans literature has revealed various phases of ,
alienation from its own cultural background and is generally
regarded with suspicion and sometimes openly rejected by Afrikanei
cultural bodies*
Lower down the economic scale Afrikaners are becoming more
indifferent to cultural organizations* As was mentioned earlier
their concerns have always been more immediate and material and
their support could only be effectively consolidated after polit-
ical victory had been achieved* Insofar as their political
support entrenches their economic position, they are quite
amenable to elite groups decorating it with ideological or cul-
tural pretensions* To the extent that these cultural pretensions
are increasingly no longer a pre-condition for political membersh:
the ranks of Afrikaner workers will be swelled by White workers
generally, thus further decreasing the appeal of exclusive Afrika:
cultural organizations* It can be argued that the failure of the
breakaway H.K.P. to read these signs lent a particular pathos to
their attempt to create a new political platform for the "true"
Afrikaner Nationalist movement. On the one hand the Afrikaner
worker had no major cause for dissatisfaction under the N
Government; on the other hand, the cultural organizations, v/ithoi
their alignment to political power stood the chance of losing
whatever remaining influence they had. Prom neither of these
sources was it realistic to expect a major defection to the H.N.]
The conclusion, to be reached from the abovenentioned changes
is that a number-of Afrikaner organizations that played a sig-
nificant role in bringing about the political victory in 1948,
axe experiencing a. £oarm of goal displacement, i,e. they are stii:
part of the machinery of political control but not quite for the
goals to which they pledged primary allegiance. Although their
allegiance is being compromised by the need to maintain political
control, it does not seem in danger of being lost to the Kationa:
Government, Thus, Afrikaner political control in White politics
seems to be ensured for the forseeable future even though .the
quality of Afrikaner Nationalism and unity is changing, This
change away from cultural exclusivism will and has- strengthened
the appeal of the National Party amongst the electorate making
the maintenance of White privilege and prosperity the issue that
will cut across the traditional (language) divisions in White
electoral politics. Given the institutional support which the
National Party enjoys as the "political arm" of a Nationalist
movement, the success with which they can manipulate the issue
of White prosperity and privilege will entrench their position
even more.within White politics.
So far, the analysis has focussed almost exclusively on
the "internal" dimension of Afrikaner politics. Prom this analys
three general inferences can be drawn:
(a) Given the historical development of Afrikaner politic
22.
dominance, it is today quite clear that political decision-
making is dominated by Afrikaner oligarchies*
(b) There is a decrease in cultural exclusivism in Afrikaner
politics which makes an increase in electoral support on
grounds other than "tribal" or ethnic affiliation much
easier*
(c) This has coincided with a greater emphasis on T/hite rather
than Afrikaner privilege and prosperity as the predominant
goal of political decisionmaking. The most important
changes which made this possible were the urban adjustment
of the Afrikaner and the drastic narrowimg of the affluence
gap between Afrikaners and other Whites generally since
1948.
However, v/hen the analysis shifts to the "external" dimension
of Afrikaner Nationalist control, i.e. in relation to the central
political problem posed in the introduction, namely, the devolution
of effective political decisionmaking, these generalizations con-
cerning developments within Afrikaner ranks, have to be modified
in terms of their implications for White politics in particular
and the problem of political change in general. The concluding
section will be concerned with a- few of these implications.
Some Implications of Change
Insofar as one of the principle functions of political
power is the redistribution of rewards and facilities, the Nation-
alist Government finds. ±±self subject to contradictory demands:
the one electoral and the other not. The cession denominator of
White political contentment is the level of privilege and prosperity
enjoyed. At the same time the lack of privilege and prosperity
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on the part of tho Blacks is the most prevalent source of politi.
discontent. The contradiction or dilemma lies therein .that the
Nationalistic Government or any V/hite Government under the pre3ei
dispensation, has to tread the path of T/hite electoral politics
to get into pov/er and once there, use the power to accommodate
demands that do not only originate from the electorate.
Within the framework of electoral politics, the Government
is only vulnerable, i.e. removable, from the "right". (That is,
insofar as they can be outbid by an opposition party in maintaini:
and/or promoting V/hite privilege.) As has been pointed out, the
possibility of this happening in the conventional electoral sense
of the word, seems remote at this stage. This was recently under-
lined by the defection of a prominent member of the United Party
to the Government (Marais Steyn)* His considerable influence
within the United Party has been applied to recruiting the "grudge
vote" in White politics. Kis defection coincided with internal
and policy changes in the United Party. The new enphasis on fed-
eralism and "shared power" (with Blacks), however ambiguously
formulated, is easily exploitable by the Nationalist Government
as a "sell-out" to the Blacks - a point already repeatedly made
(•: in the Afrikaans press.
Within the framework of national (societal) politics, i.e.
Blacks included, the Government is under pressure from the "left".
That is, insofar: as Black demands for improvenent in material con-
ditions can be effectively organized, articulated and brought to
bear on the Government. To whatever extent this does happen, it
immediately becomes an issue in White politics. This should not
be understood in a simplified economic sense of what is given to
the one (Blacks) is literally taken away from the other (Whites),
/24
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but rather the point tries to indicate the political boundaries
within which the problem of the devolution of power and consequently
privilege and prosperity have to be evaluated* In terms of these
boundaries, it is clear that the Government will be extremely
sensitive to the possibility of major fluctuations in the economy
and other non-electoral sources of pressure which cannot be readily
translated for the voters*
Given the above points, it follows that any White opposition
political party "left" of the Government will be forced into a
re-evaluation of its role as an opposition, as the option of getting
into power becomes increasingly remote, With the decreasing im- f
portance of "White tribalism" as an issue in electoral politics
a re-alignment of political affiliation on the liberal-conservative
continuum seems plausible. There are strong present indications
that White opposition parties "left" of the Government will be
involved in redefining their role as opposition after the general
election expected early in 1974*
Given the relative security of the nationalist Government
in the electoral sense, it is likely to become increasingly
intolerant of any Y/hite forms of "liberal" non-parliamentary
opposition. This was borne out in 1973 with regard to organizations
such as the Christian Institute, S.P.R.O.CA.S* and N.U.S.A.S.
It would appear that the major reason for this intolerance is the
one given by the Government when threatening to curb the English
press-in 1974, namely, that such forms of extra-Parliamentary
opposition simply confuse and exacerbate the debate between White
control and Black demands. The same intolerance has been evident
with regard to non-Government sanctioned foras of 31ack opposition*
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The general pattern that seems to be emerging, is that all
forms of dissent or opposition, whether Black or White will
increasingly be forced into Government sanctioned organizations
or institutions. This will ensure that the Afrikaner Nationalists
will play a strategic role in whatever political change may
come about.
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